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Book Reviews

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Art and Experience in Classical Greece by J. J. Pollitt. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. xiv + 205. $10.95 cloth, $3.95 paper.

Historians, interested in hard facts, or maybe just hardheaded, are at times made nervous by books on art history. For instance, a comment that the Artemis on a metope from Selinus looks "brutish" and "moronic" may evoke a skeptical response. The art critic, like the literary critic, occasionally observes what others may not find obvious. It is an old complaint. But there is really nothing to worry about in Professor J. J. Pollitt's book. Although the author has flights of intuition now and then, for the most part, he achieves a polite balance between aestheticism and a sensible recognition of what we can "know" under the circumstances.

Professor Pollitt is entitled to the space he gives to aestheticism. His genuine love for the sculptures he discusses gives his book an intimacy which holds the reader even as it must his students at Yale where he is an Associate Professor of Art and Archaeology in the Department of Classics.

The material in the book is arranged chronologically by periods and there is an underlying theme which is discussed in the Preface and again in the Epilogue. Professor Pollitt writes: "The purpose of this study is to suggest some of the basic cultural experiences which the arts were used to express and to analyze how they were used to express them." In working out this purpose, he begins with a brief discussion of the Archaic Period, devotes most of his time to the fifth century, and concludes with "The Fourth Century and Its Hellenistic Legacy." The many illustrations provided along the way are excellent. Briefly stated, his argument is that the middle period represented a remarkable blending of qualities which the earlier and later periods carried to extremes. The art of the Archaic era was characterized by "emotional impassivity." The works of the period appeared to transcend human experience. On the other hand, the fourth century artists exhibited a preoccupation with personal feelings and with individual as against communal interests. Professor Pollitt sees in the great works of the fifth century a blending of these opposite tendencies. But he goes beyond the familiar notion that high classicism represents the best in Greek art because the qualities of strength and grace are subtly combined in such figures as Myron's *Diskobolos*. Rather he finds in "the Classical moment" a philosophical "consciousness of the absolute inherent in and pervading the relative." The historical background presented relates this sublime achievement to the heyday of Athens in the period between the exhilarating victories over the Persians at the beginning of the fifth century and the later devastating experience of the Peloponnesian War.

The problems inherent in arranging and discussing works of art within given time spans are compounded when such periods are further subdivided. To narrow the discussion to a few decades, for instance "The Early Classical Period, c.

480 – 450 B. C.," and to attribute to such a short time major shifts in attitudes is perhaps an overrefinement. Yet Professor Pollitt is so lacking in contentiousness or dogmatism that there is no inclination to argue with him. His ideas are at the very least provocative even if occasionally he might seem to go too far. For instance, it is tempting for an art critic to suggest that an artist sought to encourage a particular reaction from those who viewed his works. But should a book on art history place two statues side by side "artificially" when in fact they were located miles apart? Probably only a few people ever saw both of them in their original places let alone the impossibility of seeing them together. If this is a mistake, and I think it is, the author's enthusiasm is a ready excuse.

Professor Pollitt's tolerance of other points of view, his concern for up-to-date information, readiness to alter time-honored opinions and his sturdy scholarship are lessons in themselves for his readers. Those who specialize in art history would find his book useful for their students. For historians who only conjure up the arts now and then, the book is an informative study of classical sculpture. Yet, for all of that, going back and looking at Artemis' face again, it would still be difficult to concede that she had any kind of expression at all.

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Elder Olson by T. E. Lucas. Twayne Publishers Inc., 1972. Pp. 198. $4.95.

A book *about* Elder Olson will probably arouse as much excitement in the world of literary critics as a book *by* Elder Olson. And that is saying a good deal, for almost every recent production by this important critic, generally acknowledged the current leader of the Chicago school, has considerably advanced knowledge of the various genres he has treated–tragedy, comedy, lyric and didactic poetry including rhetoric and satire. Such advances have not, unfortunately, been always well received. In his "wars" with critics of rival schools Olson has often had to turn rhetorician and satirist in order to keep some of his hard-earned theories alive. I for one am glad Mr. Lucas had the courage to write this book, for it has always seemed to me that a just recognition of the value of Olson as an original thinker and critic has been long overdue.

According to his own statement in the preface, Mr. Lucas's purpose is to treat Olson both as critic and poet. I rather wish he had confined himself solely to Olson's criticism; certainly there is enough of it for a book. And the present volume would then have had better unity. While I found Olson's poem "The Crucifix" very vivid and positively liked "In Defense of Superficiality," "Valentine to Marianne Moore," his description of the bullfight in "Plaza Mexico" and his excellent "Poet to Reader," I am not at present prepared to accept Mr. Lucas's final conclusion on his subject's skill as a poet when he says, "there is no question in my mind that Elder Olson will eventually find a place in the front rank of American poets of this century." Thinking for a moment of such names as Sandburg, Lindsay, Frost, Robinson, Pound, Eliot, Wallace Stevens and Hart Crane, not to mention several others, I find it difficult to envision

Elder Olson's inhabiting this same galaxy. This is not to say, of course, that Olson does not *know* more about lyric poetry in an articulate way than any of the aforementioned poets. But there is an essential difference between *knowing* and *doing*, as everyone recognizes, and poetry must in the last analysis be judged by the performance of the poet, rather than by his own detailed critical knowledge of definitions, structures, or final effects.

More positively, this book has much to offer not only the serious critic but the average intelligent reader. Specifically, it offers both kinds of readers an excellent chance to review the historical background of American criticism since the 1930's and much material from Aristotle's *Poetics, Rhetoric,* and *Ethics*. Its first chapter points out Olson's hunt for fallacies and his feeling of dissatisfaction with existing modern critics–particularly with I. A. Richards, R. P. Warren, J. C. Ransom, Allen Tate, Cleanth Brooks, Edmund Wilson, Norman Foerster, and other critics whose systems he finds "partial," meaning that in one way or another they mistake the parts for the whole of a poem. The second chapter, entitled "Elder Olson and Aristotle," is mainly a rehearsal of Aristotle's *Poetics* with a few refinements by Olson–for example, his definition of plot to include moral values. (It seems to me that Aristotle implies this in the *Poetics*, but apparently Olson thinks it needs saying for our day.) The third chapter, concerning Olson's own theories of art, contains some useful distinctions–for example, that between interpretation and criticism and that between imitative and didactic poetry. This chapter also contains a detailed presentation of Olson's theory on lyric poetry, which Mr. Lucas has collected from a number of different sources. Although following Aristotle's general method in deriving this theory, Olson is here highly original. His theory of the lyric is a genuine contribution to knowledge and deserves special study by teachers and graduate students of literature who may be looking for some practical assistance in the classroom. At the end of this third chapter Mr. Lucas presents Olson's interesting theory of the ethical function of imitative poetry–in a word, that it is "ideal for improving the moral character of persons who act badly, not by teaching by precept as didactic poetry does, but by the vividness with which it presents actions and characters of moral quality." Chapter four holds little new material for readers of Olson's earlier book *Tragedy and the Theory of Drama* (Wayne State University Press, 1961).

The second main division of the book, dealing with Olson's work as a practical rather than a theoretical critic, consists of three chapters and treats successively his criticism of the drama (Aeschylus, Shakespeare, Racine, and T. S. Eliot as in chapters 7-10 inclusive of *Tragedy and the Theory of Drama*), the shorter forms (such as didactic and lyric poetry), and Olson's excellent book on *The Poetry of Dylan Thomas*. The third main division is devoted to Olson's work as poet and dramatist. Although I found the two chapters in this latter division rather anti-climactic, in fairness to Mr. Lucas it should be said that he intended them to show his subject's putting to work his various theories.

Mr. Lucas has performed a useful function for the general reader in this book. Even for those already acquainted with Olson's work, this rehearsal of Olson's thought can serve a useful purpose, for many of his ideas and concepts are quite difficult to comprehend on first reading and will bare a second or third going over. The book is well organized and well written. The style is eminently

readable—clear, smooth, and tight. If the late Ronald S. Crane was easier to read than Aristotle and Olson easier than Crane, it is quite possible that Lucas may be easier than Olson.

RICHARD E. AMACHER

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Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change by Susie I. Tucker. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972. Pp. x + 224. $11.50.

Our understanding of "enthusiasm" has always been somewhat confused; few words in the last three hundred years have had such a diverse history. Its spotted trail moves through religious, religio-political, political, literary, and general cultural phases and, as readers of Ronald Knox's *Enthusiasm* (1950) will recall, we can focus on any one of these phases with profit. Knox directed his substantial study toward religious history, "with special reference to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." He could not pry into every religious and secular cranny, however, in quest of variant uses of the word, for his principal concern was with enthusiasm as an aspect and manifestation of religious belief. Susie I. Tucker takes a different thrust from Knox and such intellectual historians as E. C. Walker and Frank Manuel, who have dealt with the *concept* of enthusiasm in the last two or three decades (here one must also mention A. P. Persky's unpublished Stanford dissertation, "The Changing Concepts of Enthusiasm in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries" [1959]). As a linguistic historian, she is concerned with the word itself and its shifting definitions and connotations. Her schema is relatively complex. She isolates three kinds of definition of the word "enthusiasm": *real* definition, or the actual thing to which the word refers; *ostensive* definition, or something to which actual usage applies the word; and *evaluative* or *persuasive* definition, which tells us in what esteem enthusiasm and enthusiasts have been held at various points in history. (23-25) It will be clear from this schema that real definition will occupy little space, whereas ostensive and evaluative definitions could fill a volume far larger than this modest book.

"Perhaps there is not another word," wrote one of Wesley's followers in 1795, "which has been received into the English Language that is so frequently used and so little understood as the word *Enthusiasm*." In what ways does Miss Tucker improve our understanding? Her chief accomplishment, I think, is the sheer copiousness of her examples. It would appear that she collected quotation slips for several decades, rather like the compiler of a dictionary (it is no accident that she begins by citing the *OED*), and then wrote an extended commentary on the collection. From the point of view of examples, this is most worthwhile, for especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the word went through several changes of which scholars have always been aware but which Miss Tucker's thoroughness now permits us to document in great detail. We see, for example, how the strictly religious sense of *enthusiasm* (both favorable and pejorative) shades into political meanings about the middle of the eighteenth century and how, around the mid-nineteenth century, a multiplicity of associated

general cultural usages emerges. Thanks to her years of patient gathering and evaluation, we can now be fairly sure that seventeenth-century uses of *enthusiasm* tend to be theological (pejorative), that those of the eighteenth century (especially after 1750) are often augmented by political significations, and that those from the later nineteenth century until the present tend to deal with a generalized sense of excitement, devotion, and ardor. We could describe a pyramidiot (an Egyptological nut), a wild-eyed football supporter, an eager student, a dedicated politician, or a radical set on social reform as enthusiastic today without risking a cracked head or a libel suit. So far as shades of meaning over the last three centuries are concerned, then, Miss Tucker makes a genuine contribution and she would deserve to be referred to for some time to come on this score alone.

I said "would deserve" rather than "deserves" here because *Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change* is a difficult book to use. The nature of the topic does not make for good reading (Miss Tucker cannot be held accountable for this), and the chapters are arranged around abstract lexicographical categories which do not encourage browsing. Such chapters as 8 through 11 ("Transition and Uncertainty," "Protests at Extended Use," "Mainly Modern," "Metaphors") consist of rather miscellaneous paragraphs, often very enlightening, but ill organized. Here it may be that Miss Tucker's thoroughness is self-defeating: it is entertaining to learn about the occasional crank whose particular abnormality of behavior has been called *enthusiasm* by somebody, but in general the ups and downs of the word's history are somewhat repetitious and sometimes tedious. Again, we might blame the subject rather than Miss Tucker's approach, but I would suggest that the viewpoint of the intellectual historian would have made a much more interesting and worthwhile study. A book which devoted itself only to filling in the shortcomings of Ronald Knox would have performed an invaluable service for students of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; a work with some kind of narrative thread to it would have shed more light on our historical understanding of English literature and culture than the present book does. This, I think, is the principal shortcoming of Miss Tucker's study: she cannot escape her lexicographical categories long enough to give much attention to the effect of the *concept* of enthusiasm upon various periods of English thought.

Her chapters on connotation and religious and moral attitudes (Chaps. 2 and 3) tend toward the dark side of the word. From the mid-seventeenth century, *enthusiasm* is employed with pejorative meanings; by Wesley's time it is often regarded "as the first step in a spiritual decline and fall." (34) And Miss Tucker has plenty of evidence to illustrate every step on the descending staircase. But how did Wesley, who himself opposed enthusiasm, come to be so thoroughly identified with the worst connotations of the word in the popular mind by the later eighteenth century? For orthodox Anglicans from Dr. Johnson to Isaac Taylor it was close to fanaticism, if not worse. Here the discerning eye of the historian might have been helpful, for we find that the attack upon religious enthusiasm is almost always mounted by Anglican clergymen or writers, and that virtually all sectarian groups, including Roman Catholics, are tarred with this derogatory epithet by Anglican apologists. We see this critical process in one of Miss Tucker's best chapters, "Enthusiasts of Bad Eminence," (Chap. 5, pp. 52-61) which helps to explain why enthusiasm was of such great interest when it related to religion. The balance has shifted dramatically in our century, so

that today curiosities like angelic and diabolic possession, millenarianism, and defiance of reason seem remote by comparison to the effects of enthusiasm on mob violence, riots, and the behavior of crowds. When *The New York Times* sent a reporter to a recent Modern Language Association meeting to examine the book displays, Miss Tucker's *Enthusiasm* was one of the few plucked from thousands for description, no doubt because of the contemporary fascination with enthusiastic variants of social behavior (see Israel Shenker, "Bookstalls Sprout at Language Parley," *The New York Times*, 29 December 1972).

The importance of the book to the student of English literature lies mainly in Chapter 7, modestly entitled "Extension." (69-119) Here we see the numerous expansions of meaning beyond the religious sphere, with incursions into collecting, antiquarianism, the raptures of nature lovers, the sublime, politics and the broad area of revolutionary inspiration, and even Bardolatry. (92-93) Miss Tucker is necessarily concise: in her section on "Enthusiasm in Literature," (77-93) for example, she can do little more than trace the ramifications of the idea of genuine poetic inspiration. And if she had included examples from seventeenth-century European writers as diverse as Grotius and Morhof, she could have given us a much clearer notion of how widely acceptable the so-called "romantic" notion of poetic inspiration was throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Dennis, Shaftesbury, and Young, to name no more than three specimens, appear not as adumbrators of English Romanticism, but as historical proof that a venerable tradition of poetic inspiration never ceased to flourish in England. She brings evidence to suggest that the Oriental vogue in seventeenth and eighteenth century English literature was the result of a widespread belief that Oriental poetry (including Hebrew, as Bishop Lowth pointed out) was the product of "the wild enthusiasm of an irregular imagination." (87) But Miss Tucker is not primarily a literary or an intellectual historian, so these golden topics for further scrutiny remain unexplored in her pages.

Like her earlier *Protean Shape* (1967), *Enthusiasm: A Study in Semantic Change* attempts to synthesize a great deal of valuable but extremely heterogeneous information about the way we have used one word in the last three hundred years. One might even describe it as an immense appendix to the earlier work. The book is not quite, to use Swift's line, "incohærent Jargon of the Schools," but because of its loose organization and its lack of narrative coherence, it will be difficult for students of literature to get the use from it that the work deserves. Although Miss Tucker includes an immense bibliography, it is surely defiance of a sort to conclude a study on the dozens of meanings and sub-meanings of *enthusiasm* and on the hundreds of writers responsible for them with a mere index of names! Miss Tucker, then, has indeed given us thousands of reasons why John Wesley could refer to *enthusiasm* as a "dark ambiguous word." Her study, for all its linguistic virtues, has not exhausted the literary and intellectual possibilities of the topic. Ronald Knox, in the preface to his *Enthusiasm*, a-bristle with exclamation points, itself a little document in the history of enthusiasm, confesses that his work is "a hotch-potch." Perhaps Miss Tucker, if pressed, would do the same. She has contributed to our understanding of a difficult problem in intellectual history, but the work started by Knox is still unfinished.

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The Guest Hall of Eden by Alvin A. Lee. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. Pp. 244. $8.50.

In *The Guest Hall of Eden* Lee attempts to delineate, through four interlocking essays, the "imaginative unity" of all extant Old English poetry. It is an ambitious enterprise, but it works remarkably well. Drawing largely on the critical vocabulary of Northrop Frye, Lee proposes that underlying each individual poem there exists "an overall poetic mythology or verbal world in which certain patterns of images appear repeatedly and particular themes recur." He suggests that Old English poems may be best interpreted according to their use of these recurring patterns of imagery and theme, with reference to the entire corpus (the generic approach, he feels, tends to isolate small groups of poems and narrow the field of reference, while patristic exegesis errs in the opposite direction by reaching outside the corpus). The principal theme of this Old English poetic mythology is that of paradise created, lost and regained. The central image is that of the hall, the untarnished gold-hall of heaven or the earthly paradise (hence the book's title) and the ruined walls of the fallen world. The myth, or "design," of Old English poetry is wrought from the fusion of the poetic vocabulary and social concepts of the Germantic pagan world with the Christian "recreation, in poetic terms, of the biblical vision of human life," having as its nexus "the person and acts of Christ."

Using as the core of his argument the biblical narratives of the Junius MS ("the largest body of direct evidence in English poetry for the way the Christian mythology first took hold of the imagination of poets in Anglo-Saxon times") and supplementing this evidence with reference to biblical poetry from other manuscripts, Lee provides in his first essay a detailed exposition of the basic myth. He asserts that if the poems are arranged sequentially (which they are not in any manuscript, and this is the weak point in his argument), they present "the complete story of God and man as it extends from Creation to Doomsday." Within this linear arrangement one discerns repeated images and archetypal events which serve to unify the myth. The guiding metaphor is that of the Germanic *comitatus* or *dryht*, conceptually translated into biblical terms. The ideal dryht is that of the Christian heaven, "the perfect, unchanging society of the heavenly Dryhten and his angels." Hell is conceived as a dreadful parody of the ideal dryht, "the utter perversion of all true loyalty and love." The spiritual and moral status of the inhabitants of the world (middle-earth) is determined by their imitation of the ideal dryht of heaven (loyalty to society and God) or of the dryht of hell (treachery, anarchy, allegiance to the forces of evil). The paradigm is established in *Genesis*, where the antithetical dryhts are portrayed by the contrast between the angels loyal to God and the rebellious Lucifer. The sequence recurs in the Creation of Paradise and the Fall of Adam and Eve. The subsequent history of man oscillates between the two dryhts: "After the initial description of the ideal dryht of heaven, of the heavenly Prince with his thanes in glory, and of the subsequent rebellion, through pride, of Lucifer and his troop, the pattern is simply repeated with variations." Thus the fallen Adam, Cain, the Babylonians and the Egyptians embody the forces of the dryht of hell on middle earth, while such figures as Noah, Abraham, Moses, Judith and Daniel strive to re-establish the relationship of pre-lapsarian man to

the heavenly dryht, a task fully realized only with the advent of Christ. The final confrontation between the two dryhts occurs on Doomsday where "the process begun in the 'green plain' of Eden is complete, and the human story has wound itself back into the society of heaven whence it came."

Essay Two is concerned with what Lee labels the "narrative romances": *Andreas, Juliana, Elene* and the two *Guthlacs*. Lee defines "romance" as a "displaced" form of the central myth, whose hero is a man with "powers of action beyond those of ordinary men and [who] inhabits an imagined world in which marvelous events are commonplace." (The use of the mythic vocabulary here is somewhat distracting: the subject of this essay is simply Old English hagiographical poetry.) The protagonists of the romances share the mission to extend "the dryht of Christ into territories where it has not previously been known." Each figure must combat some representative of the dryht of hell on middle-earth, undergoing trials analogous to those of Christ before the mission is successful. The essential difference between the protagonists of the "romances" and those of the undisplaced myth is chronological: all are striving to realize the dryht of God in some unregenerate part of the world, but those of the displaced myth strive in the post-Christian world and imitate, rather than prefigure, the actions of Christ.

Where the first two essays deal with purely didactic works, in essays Three and Four Lee turns his attention to poems whose subjects matter is essentially secular: the lyrics and *Beowulf*.

It is Lee's contention that despite obvious generic differences (the lyrics are personal and private where the religious narratives are traditional and public) the lyrics partake, to differing degrees, of the images and themes of the basic myth. One may, therefore, explicate the "private dreams and aspirations" of the lyrics in terms of the "patterns of public ritual described in the longer poems." Thus, for example, the exiled protagonists of most of the elegies may be viewed as representatives of the fallen world, outcasts like Adam, Lucifer and Cain from the joys of heaven and society. Some of these exiles, such as the Seafarer and the Wanderer, are aware of the transcendent dryht of heaven; others, Deor and the speaker of *The Wife's Lament,* for example, are more limited in their vision, yearning merely for a restoration of the social dryht of middle-earth. But all share "a vision of the world and human life in their tragic aspects," and all represent some aspect of fallen man and the paradise lost theme central to the didactic poetry. The recurring motifs of exile, wandering and the ruined wall, which run throughout the lyrics, have ample precedent in the religious narratives, as Lee has shown in the earlier essays.

"*Beowulf,*" the fourth essay poem, "is a poem about hell's possession of middle-earth," combining the heroic action of the romances with the tragic vision of the lyrics. Like the protagonists of the biblical and hagiographical narratives, Beowulf is the archetype of mankind's best values, striving to defeat the forces of evil on middle-earth. Unlike the religious heroes, however, Beowulf ultimately fails, so that "the dominant vision . . . is of the defeat of man in the kingdoms of this world by the powers of darkness." Of all the essays, this one is the least convincing in its totality. Lee admits that *Beowulf* "is not as clearly and unmistakably shaped and informed by Christian myth and symbol as are most of the poems examined in the first three essays of this book" but on the whole he

proceeds as if it were, and his reading of many passages (the descent into the mere, for example) coincides with the standard typological analyses of the patristic critics. In its broader outlines Lee's analysis works fairly well for Part 1 of the poem. Heorot, in its specific association with the Creation, represents the ideal dryht on earth: "The hall, the throne, and the good king can all be seen as images of the divine power"; the antithetical, hellish dryht is symbolized by the mere, and the forces of that dryht are embodied in Grendel, whose prototype is Cain. Beowulf, engaging in "ritual reenactments of the cosmogonic myth" defeats the forces of hell and restores the "potential Paradise" of Heorot society. So far so good. What undermines Lee's argument, however, is the fact that Beowulf's success, however glorious, is only temporary, even at Heorot. Surely the Manichean universe of *Beowulf*, in which the powers of darkness are triumphant, is not entirely that of the Christian myth.

In his analysis of Part I, Lee is able to argue fairly convincingly for the presence of three mythic episodes–the cosmogonic, the fall from grace and the heroic redeemer–all of which appear in some form in the religious poetry. For Part 2 he forced to introduce a fourth myth ("the hero's death and the return to chaos" which has no counterpart in the biblical myth. Part 2 of *Beowulf*, in fact, doggedly refuses to stand under the mythic umbrella. Lee's assertion that "the myth of Cain can be used as an illuminating aid to interpretation in Part 2, *even though the poem no longer explicitly mentions it by name*" (emphasis mine) depends for its support on a convoluted, though ingenious, equation between the dragon, Grendel and Beowulf, pushing to its farthest limit the concept of "symbolic metaphor" and appealing, finally, to a somewhat elusive "mythical mode of imagining." This is not to say that Lee's discussion is without value, for his reading of individual details is constantly enlightening. The difficulty is inherent in the material: *Beowulf* has always proved intractable to monolithic critical theory.

A brief summary cannot do justice to the complexity and broad scope of *The Guest Hall of Eden*. One can argue with individual readings, perhaps, or quibble about methodology: Lee's approach at some points does not differ greatly from that of the patristic exegetes, with whom he takes issue in his concluding remarks, and his critical vocabulary is occasionally obtrusive (what, for example, is a "tragic verbal structure"?). But the faults of the book exist only in proportion to the intricacy of its design, and are redeemed by Lee's scrupulous honesty, his critical acumen and his generosity towards the foundlings of Old English poetry.

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On the Poems of Tennyson by Ward Hellstrom. Gainesville: University of Flordia Press, 1972. Pp. ix + 168. $7.50.

Ward Hellstrom gives a lean and cogent accounting of Tennyson's major poems along the thematic lines of the soul's various redemptive stages: from a prideful isolation to love both physical and for certain Christ-surrogates, finally salvation in social purpose. Tennyson has been seen descending this ladder of love before, but Hellstrom offers some theological and historical ideas of the Liberal Anglicans as "discursive analogues" to what Tennyson is saying poetically, which is, as he says, "an aspect of his art which has gone until now unexamined." While this is true, the connection between this critical purpose and the intellectual enhancement is not always felicitous. The Liberal Anglican philosophy and science of history—that is, the ideas of Julius Hare, Connop Thirlwall, Thomas Arnold, A. H. Milman, A. P. Stanley, F. D. Maurice, Richard Whately—are often presented in simplistic ways, and Tennyson's own views of history are not always offered within the context of his whole thought. Even within the confines of the interpretive commentary itself, one is occasionally aware that historical and psychological perspectives are tugging different ways.

The bulk of the book, however, is faithful to the thesis. The unity of *In Memoriam,* as Hellstrom says, lies in the "spiritual progress of the persona" as it attains the realization that Hallam "is a natural manifestation of and a means to the spiritual world of permanence and unity." The whole of the commentary, therefore, deals with the many ways that "Hallam is fused into Christ," the transformation suggested by changes in image patterns: images of sense, those associated with Christ, and certain paired, antithetical, "natural" images. The focus here is on individual salvation, with the perspective shifting when Tennyson gets to *Maud* to include redemption in social modes. Maud is, as Hellstrom says, the "Beatrice of the piece and plays, therefore, a role similar to that played by Hallam in *In Memoriam.*" The hero atones for sins of pride through love of Maud and becomes one with his kind, the war simply a symbol for the active life in the fight for a general good. In the *Idylls,* "Tennyson's vision expands further from the individual world to the world of the nation, from the natural world to the social one." The Hallam-Maud symbol bifurcates into opposites, so Hellstrom is true to his thesis in basing his commentary on the *Idylls* entirely on "a thematic consideration of the position of women" as they effect individual and social well-being. Lynette and Enid lead men to socially useful lives; Vivien perverts them to social irresponsibility; Elaine represents the last chance for spiritual purity; the nun in "The Holy Grail" is the cause of social purpose lost in the quest for individual salvation; and Ettarre and Guinevere incarnate the fleshiness inimical to social purpose.

The argument on the early and late poems—the opening and closing chapters—reveals some strain in hewing to the line. The archetypal situation in the early "poems of reconciliation to death" is that in which the Lady of Shalott, Ulysses, Tithonus, and even Arthur (coupled on page 37) find themselves: an isolated death-in-life. In embracing involvement, the protagonist chooses a "life-wish," even if death is the foreseeable result. "If death ends life," says Hellstrom, "it also makes life meaningful." But if the Lady seems to die

in a good cause and Tithonus certainly ought to, some decided critical flexibility is required to follow Hellstrom's assessment of an old Ulysses and an aged Penelope cursed by lack of "either youthful capacities or responsibilities such as providing the kingdom with an heir," a Freudian orientation that beds down uncomfortably with both the theological and the historical ones. Nor is it clear how the debacle Arthur surveys is an opting for life. When the late poems (into which Hellstrom unaccountably places "Tiresias") are threaded onto the same string, one has a mixed set of beads indeed. Following up a brief discussion of Arthur's sexual incapacities–if Guinevere has rejected the spirit, "Arthur has rejected or ignored the flesh"–Hellstrom centers a critique of Lucretius on "his inability to love sufficiently." The book ends faithful to the thesis, however, with a vision of Peresephone who "can be seen to anticipate, to prefigure, the God of Love which she promises," and is therefore like Christ, Hallam, and Maud.

Since Hellstrom's commentary is of its own fulness reverent without referring to the ideas of the Liberal Anglicans in any way, what, one may wonder, are they doing there? They occupy two chapters called "Preludes" before the discussions of *In Memoriam* and the *Idylls*, where they are apparently intended to function as a reservoir of ideas coming to Tennyson through the "Apostles," that group of gifted young men at Cambridge among whom, as Buckley has said, he "obtained his real Cambridge education." Undoubtedly, much German research and speculation and many Liberal Anglican ideas came to Tennyson through the Apostles and their mentors Hare and Thirlwall, although Hellstrom misattributes on page 29 to Tennyson a statement made by Fitzgerald about the German school and Julius Hare. Hellstrom wants to support the Hallam-Maud-Persephone axis of the concrete universal by reference to Liberal Anglican ideas of "progressive revelation" through the "principle of accommodation." Even aside from the objection that such ideas are common enough in Protestant thought, there seems little reason to bring them forth through liberal Anglican developmental theory of history" and through their distinctions between historical cycles and true Christian progress. Hellstrom's critical strategy is apparently meant to rest upon the equivalence between the spiritual growth of a nation and that of an individual, so as to stress this parallel between the development of *In Memoriam*'s persona and Tennyson's view of history. Such historical speculation as a preface to *In Memoriam*, considering especially Hellstrom's assertion in regard to this poem, that "if it was indebted to the Liberal Anglicans, seems to me to have been indebted to them as theologians," does not appear to serve any useful critical puspose and at worse misdirects the reader's attention.

The Liberal Anglicans serve Hellstrom little better as a preface for the discussion of the *Idylls*. Here he distinguishes between their science of history, which sought to understand the laws of historical cycles and apply them to contemporary social problems, and their philosophy of history, which concerned itself with spiritual progress outside of these cycles, as two levels on which Tennyson sought "to teach the lessons of history." These lessons are, respectively, that choosing flesh instaed of spirit brings "inevitable" social disintegration, and that a nation "has the opportunity to take a step forward in universal history." Hellstrom seems unaware that the area he treads is fraught with paradox. For instance, either one can choose, in which case the disintegration is not inevitable,

or, if one cannot choose, the critic flies in the teeth of Free Will, that most cherished of Tennysonian beliefs. Hellstrom clearly prefers the latter course, for he says, "The destruction of Arthur's kingdom is inevitable . . . the exercise of moral choice, on the part of Guinevere or of anyone else, seems irrelevant." Where lies the freedom of the individual? He can produce a moral code–here the Arthurian vows–superior to past codes, even if such a code has no effect whatever on the career of a state. Another monster at which Hellstrom snaps his fingers is the matter of advancing universal history. By working with the equivalence between the life-cycle of the individual and that of the nation, Hellstrom indicates an irresistible cyclicity in history. Since universal history is a concatenation of cycles, how does history move forward? By elongating the cycle? By accumulating ideals in a moral bank upon which future enterprises can draw?

Even leaving aside the question of consanguine relationships between the critical commentary and the scholarly apparatus, some serious objections can be raised about Hellstrom's understanding of the nature of historical analysis and the positions of the Liberal Anglicans. First, in speaking of the *Idylls* as displaying a "whole cycle of national history"–a "complete" and "whole cycle"–Hellstrom does not take account of the Liberal Anglican understanding that cycles come in a variety of shapes, sizes, and duration. Thomas Arnold, for instance, says that "one state may have existed a thousand years and its history may be full of striking events, and yet it may be still in its childhood: another may not be a century old and its history may contain nothing remarkable to a careless reader, and yet it may be verging to old age" (quoted by Duncan Forbes, *The Liberal Anglican Idea of History,* Cambridge, 1952, p. 21; this is the primary source-book that Hellstrom uses). Many nations, in fact, do not go through a whole cycle at all, as Arnold observes, but are fixed "in protracted infancy" or a "long living death." (p. 27) It may be feared that both Hellstrom and Duncan overreact to a poetic metaphor, that of the "organic" aspect of a nation's growth. The Liberal Anglicans specifically took pains to deny any physical resemblance between the individual and the state. An 1840 essay by Stanley discusses the "error" of the corporeal analogy and the "truth" of the "moral analogy which forms the basis of belief in a national providence" and "furnishes a complete answer to the error which would substitute for it belief in a national fatalism." (p. 58) The idea of a deterministic "inevitability" would be repugnant to the Liberal Anglicans because what occurs in history is entirely the measure of the self-caused, moral and therefore physical condition of the people. Even when there is a failure of nerve, the career of the state is hardly a "cycle" by fatal necessity. Nor is there anything, as far as I know, in Liberal Anglican thought that would support the somewhat naive notion that a nation's development is wedded irrevocably to the sexual prowess of the ruler and the faithfulness of his wife. Putative causality in history is a tricky concept and it is time that literary critics joined their colleagues in philosophy of history in treating it like the dragon it is.

On this matter of historical inevitability, then, Hellstrom's footnote on page 93 that attributes common elements to the thought of Carlyle, Tennyson, and the Saint-Simonians is frightfully misleading. René Wellek's essay on "Carlyle and the Philosophy of History" (in *PQ* of 1944 and in *Confrontations*) has long since shown that Carlyle took terms from the Saint-Simonians but that there

was no affinity in thought whatever, and certainly Tennyson loathed Saint-Simonianism—and Comtism to boot—because of the inherent determinism in French, "organic," progressivist history with its consequent denial of God and Free Will (see his grandson's *Alfred Tennyson*, p. 298, or the *Memoir*, I, 99). Not only is it wrong to attribute to Tennyson a hateful historical inevitability, but clearly it is incorrect to speak of Camelot as transcribing a "whole cycle" of development. It is truncated and rotting at the aristocratic stage, with no apparent movement into the bourgeois-commercial phase that is part of the normal cycle, the laws of which the Liberal Anglicans were so concerned to discover (let the critic do with this notion what he will). A glance into Ithaca or the view from Locksley Hall shows the bourgeois stage flourishing, even if the heroic are bored to death with it or exacerbated to tizzies, so we cannot say that Tennyson was unaware the stage existed.

Hellstrom's description of Tennyson's second historical lesson, that man is "free" to devise a superior moral code that would somehow advance universal history, is not convincing either. The central paradox in all such discussions is the nature of "spiritual Progress." It was common knowledge in Tennyson's time that the moral codes of all emerging nations—with particular attention given to Rome and medieval Germany—contain high standards of conduct. It is not clear that Camelot had attained any higher level or began with any particular advantage because of Rome's example of moral excellence at a corresponding stage of development, nor that, after Camelot's fall, coming nations would start anywhere except ground zero, with Angles, Saxons, and Jutes inheriting the earth.

If Hellstrom fails to bring about a truly symbiotic relationship between Tennyson's poems and Liberal Anglican thoughts about history, he will perhaps advance the cause of philosophy of history in literary criticism in general and Tennyson studies in particular. The concepts and terms of philosophy of history, both analytic and speculative, are new or at least strange to criticism dominated by decades of psychological orientation. The great difficulties of such ideas—the nature of narrative in both literature and history, for example, or the question of causality—are readily perceived by a perusal of the pages of new journals that work in the region between literature and history: *History and Theory*, *New Literary History*, or *CLIO*. When the complexities and imperatives of literary criticism are imposed upon those of philosophy of history, one has a real can of worms. Hellstrom's book—repeating: a thoughtful discussion of Tennyson's poems along lines of spiritual development—at least brings the elements of an "historical" criticism into view.

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The Endless Fountain: Essays on Classical Humanism edited by Mark Morford. Columbus: The Ohio State University Press, 1971. Pp. xv + 180. $7.50.

Festschrifts, like occasional poems, are risky ventures on the market. They are bound to mean more to the honored person and his associates than to the public at large, even if the public is select and the dedicatee well-known. The Ohio State University Press ought to be admired in this case, because, due to the topics of these essays, the likelihood of a profit is almost nil. Clarence Allen Forbes, honored at his retirement by these papers, is indeed well known and widely respected as a classicist of insight and enthusiasm, and as a teacher of great patience and understanding. But the field itself, unfortunately, no longer has such a reputation, and the number of scholars committed to "keeping up" on attitudes toward classical humanism is small and dwindling. For those who *are* interested in the classical tradition and its relationship to today's higher education, this book is pointedly revealing, challenging, and, I think, prophetic. I must admit that I read it out of a certain mildly perverse curiosity. As a lover and mourner of classical studies, I wanted to see whether the writers of these essays could convince us that the fountain is endless while it seems to be drying up. I was not too surprised, then, to find four out of five of them straining to prove that humanism is a very *now* subject. Charles L. Babcock's essay, "The Classics and the New Humanism" does it, for example, by demolishing traditional definitions of humanism and recasting it as a part of the ecology movement, then urging classicists to be "angry with what they are learning of themselves and of how the environment, physical and social, falls short of [its] human and technological potential." (26) Although Professor Babcock rises in his peroration to a sense of urgency, his piece shares with two others a telling tedium of style, caused primarily by countless passages of inexcusably insignificant generalizations about education's (or humanism's) characteristics, weaknesses, enemies, hopes, etc. I kept remembering, with appropriate shame, a quaint old professor of the Classics at an Ohio liberal arts college who gave annual May Day orations in Latin on the quadrangle, even after no one took Latin, even, one year, when tear gas cannisters were flying about in Washington. He may have known the secrets of wisdom, but he was so out of touch with modern modes of rhetoric that no one would listen, however many tolerated his performance. Babcock tries to address himself to that problem, but his answer seems to require classics departments everywhere to justify their existence by teaching not classics but Man and his Environment. The fact that Sociology departments already do that is unnerving.

By far the best essay of the group is William McDonald's "Classicism, Christianity, and Humanism." McDonald surveys the history of the classics in education briefly but with remarkable clarity, pointing out the changes in definition that accompanied changes in society. He concludes that Christian humanism is on its way out because Christianity is on its way out as a controller of social values; humanists must, if they will survive, join English departments or find new bodies of myth and wisdom to interpret to students in order to teach both the nature and the control of the emotions. "Humanism is like love," he says; "no precise definition can be given. . . . It must be experienced to be appreciated." (53) His conclusion is somewhat dismal: the end of a very long

tradition of curricular prominence. Yet it recognizes, as few of the essays in this book do, that the proper core of humanism is not the language in which works are written but the subject and the stature of them. "To the humanist the universe is anthropocentric. He may be wrong. It may not be. But it is the only assumption that makes the human condition tolerable." (57)

Oskar Seidlin's note on Goethe's reinterpretation of *Iphigenia in Tauris* is a refreshing interlude in a sea of desperation and resignation. He shows, as clearly and simply as a good teacher should, why Euripides was important to Goethe and how Goethe chose to understand him in his peculiarly romantic way. He apologizes for neither playwright, and his hypothesis may well be the key to the survival of the classics if we will listen: he finds that for each writer, "no matter how poignant a projection of his own emotional travail, his play is at the same time a conscious formulation of the human condition as such." (130) In the Greek classic, it is a matter of self-recognition; for Goethe, it is an avowal of the importance of man's authenticity, and so, says Seidlin, Goethe's whole play centers around the discovery and the confession of truth. His short essay seems overwhelmed by those surrounding it, but it is the best piece of honest scholarship in the book.

I am reluctant to say much about David Heimann's seventy-page treatise on Christian humanism in Jerome's era. The work is too long for such a superficial survey; it ought to have been either half its length or else, with adequate substantiation, a monograph. Unfortunately the more specific Heimann gets in his discussion of Jerome and his milieu, the more he errs. He admonishes Jerome for "concealing" his sources, in apparent ignorance of medieval concepts of *imitatio* and *copia;* he supposes Jerome's style to be baroque because it is Senecan (what would Morris Croll have said!) and suggests in confusion that such a practice is "the application of the techniques of verse writing to prose." (108, 126) Many of his points, if they are not over-generalized, are dissipated in retractions—in fact his conclusion seems to contradict his very purpose in writing: he first explains at great length how the terms "Christian humanism" can be applied in the fourth century and to patristic writing; then he concludes that neither the fourth century nor Jerome are very admirable transmitters of the classical tradition, that Jerome was a bungler in his efforts.

The final essay, Harry C. Rutledge's "Classical Latin Poetry: An Art for Our Time," suffers like Heimann's from overgeneralization and like Babcock's from a desperate attempt at relevance. Rutledge attempts to appear at home in all the arts of all times, but he falls sadly short. His thesis is that T. S. Eliot's generation embodied the first resurgence of the lost classical spirit of self-discovery since Virgil. All the intervening history has been subject to the monotonous reign of a "Cult of Beauty." The first widespread criticism of the burden of such standards, he says (ignoring Dante, Rabelais, the English Royal Society, Swift, Baudelaire, Poe), began in the 1880's with Gaugin. He might at least have credited the *Salon des refusés.* He says that Virgil was the Jackson Pollock of the Hellenistic age, and uses a Keatsian vocabulary to show that Lucretius was an existentialist. Like most of the other essayists, Rutledge would be well-advised to apply to himself the Delphic oracle they all point to so readily: *γνῶθι σεαυτόν, Nosce teipsum,* Know thyself.

In this volume, then, only the essay by McDonald stands out, and it is very

much worth reading, even required of students in the liberal arts. Seidlin's bright and correct essay is really only of value to students of German neo-classical and romantic literature, who, with the rest of us, might do well to skip the remainder of the book. The introduction by Mark Morford and the epilogue by Kenneth Abbott, by the way, are models of level headed, creative thinking and eclectic conclusion. Why they did not contribute more substantially to this festschrift I cannot imagine; Morford especially, an experienced and sensitive critic and a very successful teacher, ought to have given us, and Professor Forbes, more of himself in this presentation.

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Milton's Earthly Paradise: A Historical Study of Eden by Joseph E. Duncan. Minnesota Monographs in the Humanities, vol. V. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. Pp. viii + 329. Ten plates. $12.50.

The Christian Poet in Paradise Lost by William G. Riggs. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. viii + 194. $7.50.

These two studies illustrate two very different methods of illuminating *Paradise Lost*. One assembles a great deal of information relevant to Milton's epic; the other closely examines the poem itself.

Professor Duncan's book is a history of the Christian concept of the earthly Paradise with particular reference to Milton. It conveys a sense of the innumerable associations which Paradise had for Milton and his contemporaries, of the complex criss-crossing of influences, of dimensions of the concept which we of a later time comprehend only imperfectly. In reading Duncan's account of earlier treatments of the Garden, one is constantly reminded of details in *Paradise Lost*: of the waters of Milton's Garden, its flowery lawns and stately trees, its sweet sounds and odors, its perpetual spring, the steep cliff on the east, the flaming swords of the cherubim. Yet the author avoids unwarranted assumptions of specific source. Most features of Milton's Paradise arise from a collective source—the tradition.

Although the brief story in Genesis was the basis of all Christian thinking about the earthly Paradise, the Christian tradition borrowed from classical myth and poetry concerning the Golden Age. Duncan shows that Milton has drawn indirectly and directly from Homer, Hesiod, Virgil, Ovid; the sensuous loveliness of his Paradise has been enriched and intensified by the classical poets. The concept of Paradise was initially formulated by the Church Fathers and the early hexameral authors and was greatly elaborated by medieval Christian writers. The fantasy and allegory of the medieval treatments, however, were superseded by the "firm, reasonable, and enlightened belief in the historical paradise" which seemed to the Renaissance (and to Milton) "the necessary foundation for Christianity itself." (89) Duncan reviews the pertinent Renaissance writings, theological and literary. These constitute the immediate milieu in which Milton wrote.

"Milton's re-creation of paradise is not only superb poetry of great allusive subtlety . . . [but] also a penetrating account of the origins of man." (5) Like the Renaissance commentators on Genesis, he has attempted to explain the primitive patterns and the rational bases of society and its institutions. In representing our parents and their life in Eden, he has expressed and illustrated his convictions concerning fundamental social and moral questions: the law of nature, the covenants of grace and works, the derivations and proper limits of human knowledge, marriage and the family, the natural rights of man, the social contract, and other subjects. The two final books of *Paradise Lost,* by showing the corruption of the original ideals, furnish a somber historical counterpoint.

Since Milton is endeavoring to create a Garden of Eden which is credibly historical, he feels, as many Renaissance writers feel, the need to locate it and to give it distinctive physical features. He agrees with the majority that it was located in Mesopotamia. Like various predecessors, he places it on a high plateau and watere it with a river welling up from beneath. Although in some notable details he departs from the conventional, both the geography and the imagery of his opulently beautiful Paradise owe a great deal to his immediate predecessors. Milton has rejected allegory, yet his concrete, historical garden is diffused with spiritual significance. It is the "type," the foreshadowing, of the heavenly Paradise. It suggests also the subjective happiness, the "Paradise within," of the innocent and righteous man.

In his earlier book—on the fortunes of the metaphysical style in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—Professor Duncan demonstrated his bility in the gathering and organization of material drawn from a very large field. *Milton's Earthly Paradise* covers an even vaster and more various area. Like most studies of such a comprehensive nature, it presents more information than any reader can absorb, and sometimes the author seems to forget to select. Yet no one will object greatly to his inciuding details which have no direct bearing on Milton. One becomes acquainted with numerous interesting opinions: that a sinless Adam would have propagated by fission, that Adam spoke High Dutch, that he was an enormously productive author, that Adam and Eve enjoyed Paradise together for only a few hours, that Adam was created September 12, 3928 B. C. Duncan reviews a great many conflicting doctrines, but usually in doing so he points out Milton's choice among alternatives and the significance of each choice. His best accomplishment, I believe, is his revelation of the imaginative and unifying transmutation which Milton has given his heterogeneous material. His principal point, perhaps, is that Milton's Garden is the most perfect poetic embodiment of the Renaissance vision of the Age of Innocence and its beautiful setting.

Professor Riggs undertakes to isolate and define the personal element in *Paradise Lost*. Puritan individualism, he says, has encouraged Milton to project himself and his own problems into his poem and to offer "himself as an example of the Christian in conflict." (190) Readers of Milton's works who have found him personally repellent might expect this personalization of the poem to contaminate it with the poet's undeniable egotism. But however highly he may evaluate himself, a writer who attributes his powers and accomplishments to divine aid can hardly be said to be congratulating himself. Two parallel and contrasting threads run through *Paradise Lost*: Satan's self-sufficient arrogance

and the poet's humble confidence that, because he has been divinely chosen and is divinely supported, he is capable of great achievements.

In telling the story of Satan, Milton illustrates the evil of presumptuous pride. in telling the story of Adam and Eve, he deals with the limitations of human knowledge and human reason. Man cannot finally rely on his own faculties. Both stories show that there can be no virtue without unquestioning acceptance of one's proper station in God's hierarchy. Both show Milton's concern with problems which all Christians must face and conflicts in which all must engage.

Paradise Lost reveals also his concern with his own craft. Milton's Adam has much in common with his creator, for he is a poet, the first singer of love songs and of hymns to the beauty of God's world. His style is that of the Christian humanist. Milton regards pagan precedents and "natural impulses" as proper material for use in religious poetry, but he relies primarily on "the grace of God's direction." (79) Certain problems peculiar to the Christian poet arise in his presentation of the angelic narrators. Like them the poet is a spokesman for God, and he shares with them the difficulty of expressing God's ways and works in human terms and in "answerable style."

Regarding himself as God's agent and medium of revelation, Milton looks to the Son as an ideal pattern for his imitation. In a limited way, he believes, the poet creates as the Son has created; the work of art, like the physical universe, has its balanced constructions and its harmonies. Like the Son, Milton combines great aims and actions "with humble obedience." (181)

The basic ideas in the volume are unquestionably valid. Interpretive writing such as this, however, is more vulnerable than a work of historical scholarship, in detail if not in general. Riggs frequently uses the very ambiguous term *nature*. He should define it. He argues rather lengthily (115-34) that Milton's bombastic account of the war in Heaven is intended as a confession and demonstration of the inadequacies of the epic style. This theory seems to me very questionable. He remarks that, for "the best of Milton's recent critics, analogical complexity is the principle of design in *Paradise Lost*." (8-9) Recent criticism has perhaps discovered more echoes, parallels, types, analogies, tensions, polarities in Paradise Lost than the poet intended; and Riggs, I believe, is a little too eager to engage in the critical game of searching out unsuspected subtleties which is currently popular. There are other things in the book which might be questioned.

But it accomplishes its purpose very well; it gives definition to a significant element in *Paradise Lost*, one which has often been perceived but which has never before been specifically and systematically treated. Professor Rigg's treatment is clear, well documented, pleasantly readable, and on the whole convincing.

Both of these books overlap previous studies to some extent. As the commentary on Milton piles up mountainously, it becomes harder and harder to find wholly fresh fields or pastures altogether new. Surely Milton studies have reached a point of diminishing returns. But these two volumes seem to demonstrate the contrary. Each of them, in its own way, significantly adds to and modifies one's understanding of *Paradise Lost*.

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